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ABSTRACT. While the science of animal biotechnology is advancing at a rapid pace, the ethical discussion about
the boundaries the public might want to set is at the most nascent stage. There is a tendency in the public
debate for opponents to favor an all-out ban on the science, while proponents want to grant it carte blanche. I
argue that a more nuanced position on animal biotechnology considers individual projects to be located on
a moral continuum, where some are clearly morally justified, others morally impermissible, and some lie in the
ethical gray-zone. To begin to define this continuum, we use the bioethical method of casuistry to analyze one
case at the end of moral permissibility, and we contrast it with a case that is located at the opposite end of the
moral spectrum. I advocate this approach to assessing the moral merit of biotechnology projects because of its
attention to the details of individual cases — the protocols, ends, and methods — on which an accurate moral
judgment necessarily rests.

T

he science of animal biotechnology is progressing very rapidly, as seen in projects ranging from
pet cloning to biopharming to xenotransplantation to the preservation of endangered species. While
the science of animal biotechnology advances undeterred, the ethical discussion about the boundaries the
public might want to set is at the most nascent stage.
While some favor a blanket prohibition of animal biotechnology that is unlikely to be imposed on the biotechnology industry, most others view this science as
having a continuum of moral permissibility, with some
projects seemingly justified and others not. But which
of the animal cloning and transgenic projects are ethically permissible, and which ones cross an important
moral line?
To make these critical ethical decisions, we need a
moral framework for conducting an analysis of particular animal biotechnology projects. If we are to escape the trap of rejecting or embracing all animal
biotechnology, we need an approach that focuses on
the individual protocols, ends, and methods of specific
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projects. This emphasis on the particular is necessary
for a field like animal biotechnology where projects
are pursued for a myriad of reasons, involving varying
degrees of animal suffering, alteration, or modification.
With its history of case-sensitivity, I advocate the use of
bioethical casuistry as the most useful method of moral
evaluation.
To demonstrate this method of assessing the merits
of biotechnology research, I examine two contrasting
projects with human-medical implications: the ‘‘biopharming’’ of transgenic goats in order to harvest
proteins in the animals’ milk; and the creation of genetically modified pigs for the long-term goal of xenotransplantation.
On this casuistical approach, I use the first project as
a paradigm case of moral permissibility; I then use the
moral insights gleaned from this case to reflect on other
current animal-biotechnology projects, focusing specifically on the case of genetically modified pigs. The goal is
the description of a moral continuum along which other
projects in the animal biotechnology can be located.
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Casuistical analysis of animal biotechnology
First used in the Middle Ages, casuistry was considered a viable approach to moral judgment until the
seventeenth century, when it fell out of favor. It has
recently been revived in contemporary bioethics because
of its reliance on paradigm cases — a strategy akin to the
use of legal precedent — which functions well in a field
that often advances its thinking based on reflections
about particular clinical- or research-ethics cases. Casuistry, then, is a bioethical approach to ethical analysis
in which moral permissibility is determined by analyzing
a particular case, mining that case for the ethical considerations relevant to it, and producing moral principles
or ‘‘rules of thumb’’ that capture the insights and intuitions discovered there. This method was first articulated
for bioethics by theorists Albert Jonsen and Stephen
Toulmin in their book The Abuse of Casuistry: A History
of Moral Reasoning. Since the use of casuistry is
comparatively new in bioethics, debate about which of
its versions is most defensible is still on-going; here I
follow the interpretation articulated by John Arras.2
The distinguishing feature of Arras’s casuistry is that
‘‘ethical principles are ‘discovered’ in the cases themselves, just as common law legal principles are developed
in and through judicial decisions on particular legal
cases.’’3 Arras considers his version of casuistry to be
faithful to the theory articulated by Jonsen and Toulmin,
not an alternative to it. I agree that two different strains
of casuistry can be found in their work, with two different views of the role and status of moral principles. In
the first strain, principles are simply applied to a new
case; in the second, principles are actually generated in
the cases themselves. Both strains are evident in the
work of Jonsen and Toulmin, and I believe that each
strategy has an important function in the field of bioethics. For novel problems with very little precedent,
the strategy of using the cases to generate guiding principles is most helpful; in areas of bioethics that can be
analogized to other well-trod ground, bringing widely
accepted principles to bear is more helpful.
In my analysis, then, rather than coming to a case
with a set of relevant principles already in hand and
then applying them, I first reflect on the case and then
generate principles that articulate the moral considerations found there. These new ‘‘principles’’ can then be
used to reflect on other, similar cases. This method
makes room for novel ethical solutions to moral
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problems because it does not demand that we secure
agreement on the set of principles that ought to govern
in the specific case before we begin. What casuistry
seeks instead is agreement on what is morally relevant
in the case — that is, agreement on our moral reactions
to the case. Arras writes, ‘‘Progress . . . [is] achieved, not
by applying agreed-upon principles, but rather by
seeking agreement on responses to particular cases.’’4
This method is especially suited to the animal biotechnology, where the uncharted moral terrain of cloning and transgenesis has no widely accepted moral
principles that can be effectively and helpfully applied.
We have no clearly articulated principles to guide us in
our reflections on this new area of science, short of
the cluster of principles that guide any animal experimentation, such as the principle of using appropriate
sedation or anesthesia.5 But it is not enough to navigate this new technology to know how to treat the
new clones or transgenic animals once we have created
them or during the process of creation; we need to know
whether we ought to create them in the first place.
Therefore, current animal regulations will not offer
much insight. We need new guiding principles, and
casuistry may enable us to generate them. Here I argue
for the acceptance of a particular project as the paradigm case of moral permissibility for animal biotechnology generally. I claim that the moral considerations
generated in that paradigm case can be codified into
two principles usable elsewhere along the animalbiotechnology continuum.
One important note: the cases to be used here are,
technically speaking, ‘‘hypothetical’’ ones. Since the
details of current projects can change so rapidly (and
since the lay person has access to research facts only
once research is completed, or well underway), I present
types of projects, though scientifically viable ones that
either have been or are being conducted, staying faithful
to their methods but not claiming to report particular
work done in any particular laboratory. Again, I am
trying to describe a moral continuum secured by principles applicable to actual animal-biotechnology projects pursued around the globe. I am not commenting on
specific scientists or projects.

Case 1
I start with a transgenic project involving the
modification of goats for the purpose of biopharming.
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Take the following case: transgenic goats are produced
that secrete into their milk a human protein that will be
harvested to treat a disease, which has no other effective
treatment; a human gene is introduced into an early
goat embryo, which is then implanted into a surrogate;
only a handful of goats are produced this way; once the
founder herd is produced, the goats are naturally bred
and the offspring will express this same protein in their
milk; the protein is harvested by normal means of
milking; no additional restrictions are placed on the
herd due to its biopharming function: they are kept in
pastures, in groups; the transgenic goats are confined so
that they do not breed with other goats used in
agriculture; and, no detectable differences exist between the health status of the genetically modified
(GM) goats and non-GM goats.
This claim about the health status of GM goats
reflects what appears to be the case in current transgenic
science. It is too early to determine whether the longterm health of these animals will mirror naturally bred
animals. But if transgenic goats suffer decreased
lifespan or as-yet-undetected congenital abnormalities,
comparison cases — pigs bred for xenotransplantation — will suffer in similar ways. However, depending
on the severity of the problem and the suffering that
accompanies it, this compromised health status may
indeed alter our assessment of moral permissibility — in
all cases.
A casuistical analysis of this case starts by highlighting moral considerations or features that we find their,
i.e., what matters ethically. First, genetic modification
per se does not cause pain or suffering in the animal.
Second, the animal’s ‘‘species-life’’ — the animal’s
preferences, conditions under which the animal thrives,
etc. — is protected, despite biopharming. Assuming that
‘‘quality of life’’ for a goat — what we are calling
‘‘species-life’’ — means being able to roam free,
uncaged, without being separated from other members
of that species, then these transgenic goats in the project
we describe have a quality of life no different from
domestic goats raised for agricultural purposes on farms
that pay close attention to animal welfare issues, i.e.,
that adhere to the highest standards of animal husbandry. The preferences and conditions under which
the goat species thrives are not undercut in this type of
transgenic modification. Because the intended product
of transgenic goats is the milk, which is the same product
in conventional, non-GM farming of goats, there need
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be no extra restrictions placed on the lives of these
goats, so the herd need not be treated differently from
non-GM goats. It is only after the milk is procured that
the special process of harvesting the protein in the milk
is begun. Additionally, because this milk is not going to
be consumed as milk (it is only the protein that will be
used, and only after extensive clinical trials that test for
safety and efficacy), and the goats will not be used for
meat, there are no concerns here about potential risks
to human beings in consuming such GM products.
Similarly, since the confinement of these GM goats is
easy to achieve, the breeding with non-GM goats
(a potential environmental hazard) is easy to avoid.
If the features of the case discussed above really are
all morally salient (that is, really do matter to us morally and are therefore worth our moral consideration),
then we may ‘‘try out’’ two different moral principles
that attempt to capture them. I use the language of
‘‘trying out’’ a principle — something like an ethical
audition — because in casuistical theory new moral
principles are not immutable but serve as guidelines
that, as Arras puts it, ‘‘are always subject to further
revision and articulation in light of new cases.’’6 The
goal in casuistry is to find principles that do effective
moral work in the real situations we find ourselves in;
casuistry is not an esoteric exercise in establishing irrefutable commandments that we may or may not be able
to apply to the concrete problems we face.
To this end of finding pragmatic principles that
may help us navigate the landscape of animal biotechnology, we can employ the two traditional modes of
moral reasoning used to assess moral permissibility:
consequentialist reasoning that determines permissibility based on costs and benefits; and nonconsequentialist
reasoning that determines permissibility based on moral
rules. If we start with consequentialist reasoning and
take into account all of the salient features of a case,
then we find enormous potential benefits to the human
recipients of safe and effective pharmaceuticals efficiently produced; little, if any, sacrifice by the animals
used in the process; and no risks to the environment. In
an ethical cost-benefit analysis, this project appears to
have all gain and no cost. (Again, this conclusion would
change if animals were found to suffer greatly from
genetic modification. So far they have not seemed to.)
On purely consequentialist or utilitarian terms, the
moral evaluation of this project is overwhelmingly
positive.
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But what did casuistry do for this analysis that
garden-variety consequentialism would not have been
able to accomplish? In other words, what is new about
this old mode of ethical assessment? Certainly not the
weighing of costs and benefits, nor utility maximization. What casuistry does for this mode of moral
reasoning is to put into relief all of the features of the
case that need to be incorporated into the equation
without first needing to settle century-long debates
about animal rights or animals’ moral status. I do not
mean here to dismiss the importance of these philosophical debates, but their seemingly interminable
character makes waiting for resolution impractical,
especially when we need to reach conclusions now
about current scientific projects.7
If we now switch our mode of moral reasoning to
a non-consequentialist one, we will need to look for
a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ with which to codify our moral
responses. One feature that mattered to us was that the
goats’ ‘‘species-life’’ had integrity — that the goats’
preferences for social interaction, stimulation, and
activity be respected to whatever degree we can
comprehend those preferences. On the other hand,
while the goats were clearly being used for human
purposes, the fact that the goats were instrumental
goods did not in itself seem morally problematic.
Combining these two responses, we might try the
following rule of thumb, or new casuistical principle:
‘‘Animals may be used for human benefit, if the specieslife of the animal is also respected at the same time.’’ In
more formal philosophical language, we might say,
‘‘Animals may be treated as a ‘means’ to some human
purpose if they are also treated as ‘ends’ in their own
right.’’ This principle clearly has Kantian undertones,
but Kant would not have liked it. Immanuel Kant was
an eighteenth-century moral philosopher who carefully
articulated what it meant for human beings to have
moral standing. He was concerned about the treatment
of animals, but his rationale was that we degrade
ourselves by abusing animals. He did not think they
were due any type of true moral regard the way human
beings were. In fact, Kant would have protested that it
was a version of what he called the second formulation
of the Categorical Imperative, and, since this Categorical Imperative only applied to rational beings, he
would have bristled at our ‘‘borrowing’’ it for this
purpose. This is not a principle that Kant used to talk
about our obligations to animals, and he would not
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have endorsed it for this purpose. In fact, he specifically
wrote, ‘‘Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.’’8 But as we struggle to define the
proper relationship between human beings and animals, and the proper treatment of animals, I believe this
principle offers us a reasonable standard and safeguard
that effectively captures our moral responses to the
first case: using animals for our purposes is morally
permissible as long as we respect them as sentient beings
in their own right, ones that require species-specific
conditions in order to thrive. In this redefinition of
what it means to be an ‘‘end in itself,’’ animals are
entities whose suffering makes them worthy of moral
consideration. Because they have a certain constellation
of needs, preferences, and interests whose unfulfillment
makes them suffer, we cannot simply use them in any
way, under any and all circumstances, without regard
for those needs, preferences, and interests. We can use
them, but only under the condition that their own
species-life is respected. Returning to our case, the
transgenic project described above recognizes the particular species-interests of the GM goats and grants
them the conditions under which they can be expected
to thrive, while at the same time utilizing them for
a noble and important human purpose. In the terms of
our new casuistical principle, it treats them as an end,
not purely as a means.
The advantage of our new rule is that it does exactly
what casuistical theory says it should: it articulates
a belief that most of us already intuitively hold. Of the
casuistical method, Arras writes, ‘‘Rather than serving
as a justification for certain practices, principles within
the new casuistry often merely seem to report in
summary fashion what we have already decided.’’9
Let us think about this in light of our views on animals
and animal rights. On the one hand, we submit that
most people believe that the argument in favor of
animal rights goes too far: after all, if animals have
rights, then we cannot use them for food or clothing or
in research unless doing so also serves the animals’
purposes.10 Nathan Nobis summarizes this perspective:
if animals have rights, ‘‘then all industries and practices that exploit animals for their instrumental value
ought to be abolished, and the individuals involved in
this exploitation should be stopped. And this is true,
regardless of the possible losses to the exploiters: they
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have no right to ill-gotten gains . . . Rights impose the
duty that justice is done, as the saying goes, ‘though the
heavens fall.’’’11 Very few people hold this radical
position on animals. On the other hand, the debate —
framed typically against the plausibility of animal
rights — often concludes that animals do not merit
serious moral consideration.12 But most people would
reject that result as well. The middle-of-the-road position most of us hold steers us beyond this impasse and
toward the view that animals can indeed be legitimately
used but that our use of them should not result in the
utter disregard of their species-life.
In review, I have argued that a casuistical approach
to the first case shows that this instance of biopharming
is morally permissible from either a consequentialist or
nonconsequentialist perspective, using the principles we
‘‘discovered’’ in the case analysis. Thus, this case of
biopharming serves as the paradigm case of moral
permissibility that sets the standard against which other
projects in animal-biotechnology can be measured.
Having described a moral continuum along which
various animal-biotechnology projects can be located
according to their level of moral permissibility or
impermissibility, I have argued that this type of transgenic project would be located at the far moralpermissibility end. In answering the question, ‘‘Which
projects in animal biotechnology should we endorse?’’ I
would begin with that point on the continuum and
judge how far out we ought to travel. As a contrast
point on the continuum — a point I believe to be located
at the far other end — I will consider a project in the
field of xenotransplantation. Again, I am not arguing
that all xenotransplantation research will be located at
the impermissible end of the moral continuum, just as I
am certainly not arguing that all projects using transgenic goats will be located near the moral-permissibility
end. Moral assessment lies in the factual details of
individual cases.

Case 2
Take as a contrast case a project involving the genetic
modification of pigs, which are designed to be ‘‘organ
factories’’ for human beings. The background to this
project is an international shortage of human organs for
transplant and thousands of people dying every year on
waiting lists. Given the circumstance that lies behind
this project, it is clear that the scientific motivation is
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noble and pure: there is a profound human need and the
use of GM animals may provide one possible solution.
In this project, the pigs are genetically modified (by
‘‘knocking out’’ certain genes) to avoid two impediments to solid organ xenotransplantation: hyperacute
rejection and acute vascular rejection.13
I begin this analysis by focusing on the particular
conditions and restrictions imposed on pigs in one
xenotransplantation project for the purpose of ensuring
that they do not deliver to graft recipients either swine
or human pathogens. To avoid passing along such
pathogens, these pigs must first avoid exposure to them,
and they must thus be born into and raised within
a practically sterile environment. Clearing a bar this
high requires drastic departures from the conditions in
which pigs thrive. Pigs, it turns out, are highly social
animals, extremely intelligent, with a curiosity that,
unfulfilled, turns into self-destructive or aggressive
behavior. They form social bonds and require social
relationships. In this xenotransplantation project, the
alteration of the pigs’ environment begins at birth: the
pigs are delivered from the sow inside the uterus via
cesarean section and placed in a sterile incubator. They
are not allowed to suckle; in fact, they have no contact
with their mothers at all, and the mother is euthanized
after the birth. In their sterile containers, there are no
objects to satisfy the pigs’ natural need for rooting or
intellectual stimulation. They are kept confined, often
alone. In summary, the species-life of the animal is
completely disrupted by the research.
A second ethical concern raised by this type of
project involves the human recipients, rather than the
pigs, and may actually extend beyond the individuals
who receive the xenografts, namely: the potential for
transmission of a lethal, possibly contagious, disease
that is undetected or non-pathological in the source pig.
This is not an insignificant risk even in human-tohuman transplants, as a recent case of rabies in four
organ recipients shows.14 In pig-to-human transplants,
this threat may be much more serious since there may be
pathogens we have yet to discover even in pig species.
Two xenotransplantable pathogens have already been
identified, one already endemic in human beings (the
cytomegalovirus in the herpes family15) and one not
found in the human species (the porcine endogenous
retrovirus, or PERV16). While some scientists view these
risks as small,17 others are not so sanguine. Pioneer
xenotransplant researcher Leonard Bailey, who in 1984
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first transplanted a baboon heart into an infant, writes,
‘‘Fear of viral activation, recombination and/or mutation leading to some never before observed human
illness . . . seems justified, and the issue requires further
investigation.’’18 On this ground alone, many bioethicists19 and advocacy groups20 argue against coming to
rely on xenotransplantation to solve the organ-shortage
problem.
With the foregoing in mind what can we now say
about the moral permissibility of this xenotransplantation project? On a consequentialist, or utilitarian,
calculus of the ethical cost versus ethical benefit, it
might seem as if the need for organs outweighs all
considerations of the animals being used, assuming that
animal suffering matters, but that animals’ moral status
falls short of having rights. But the benefit-side of the
equation is not so clean: significant biological hurdles
must be overcome regarding rejection and infection.
These two problems lead Bailey to conclude: ‘‘Together,
the lack of efficacious host survival and concerns about
the potential for novel, swine-induced host infection,
have put a lock on clinical trials of pig-to-human solid
organ xenotransplantation during the foreseeable future.’’21 On balance, then, if we consider all of the issues
that matter to us morally in this case, the cost to animals
and the questionable benefits to human beings appear
to make this use of animal biotechnology morally
unjustifiable.
A nonconsequentialist analysis of xenotransplantation suggests no better prospect for justifiability. Using
the principle that we ought to treat an animals as a
means only if we also treat it as an end — that is, we
ought never to treat an animal as a pure means — this
project obviously will not pass ethical scrutiny. In the
project described, xenotransplantation research shows
no respect for the integrity of the animals being used
and no consideration for the quality of life of the pigs.
In summary, then — and in contrast to the
biopharming project, ethically an ‘‘all gain and no cost’’
proposition showing demonstrable respect for the
species-life of transgenic goats — xenotransplantation
projects using pigs appear to offer gain only if organs
can actually be produced safely and transplanted
effectively on a scale required to meet demand while
presenting tremendous cost (certainly to the pigs and
possibly to human beings) and demonstrating no
respect for the species-life of the pigs. This judgment
puts xenotransplantation research on the opposite end
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of the moral continuum from the transgenic goats
project.
To this criticism of xenotransplantation, the proponents might offer the following rejoinder: what is the
moral difference between using pigs for food and
using them as organ donors? Surely, they would argue,
using pigs to save human lives is much nobler than
to using pigs to satisfy our base appetites, given all the
nonanimal foods we could use to nourish our bodies.
They would add to their case the argument that the pigs
in this research are certainly treated better than the pigs
subjected to factory farming, which is the most common type of farming in the industrialized West today.
At least these pigs are disease-free and kept in hygienic
conditions.
The response to these counterarguments is that
proponents of xenotransplantation are using a false
comparison: on the question of organs versus food, we
cannot compare a morally impermissible method of
farming with (as argued here) a morally impermissible
method of medical research; we need to compare the
case of humane farming with this type of medical
research. Raising pigs by factory farming is not
necessary; the quality of pork is not undermined by
keeping pigs in their natural habitat under conditions
that meet their natural needs; it might even be enhanced. The reason pigs are subjected to factory farming is to keep yield high and price low. But, again, eating
as much pork as we do is not necessary to sustain
human life; in fact, we would probably be healthier if
we ate less meat, and the increase in price that would
correspond to instituting better conditions for agricultural animals might thus serve us well. So to make
a legitimate comparison between using pigs for organs
and using pigs for food, we need to compare the best
means possible to produce the organs and the best
means possible to produce the pork. If restrictive
conditions are necessary safely to produce organs for
transplant, but natural conditions are possible to
produce food, then the production of pork by humane
farming methods appears to be morally permissible
where the production of organs for transplantation
does not. If pigs can be raised in less restrictive
conditions for xenotransplantation, then the ethical
analysis may look different. In the present case, based
on the methods and protocols of xenotransplantation
research as outlined, this solution to the scarcity-oforgans problem is morally suspect. Xenotransplantion
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appears to be at the opposite end of the moral continuum from biopharming.
But need xenotransplantation research be conducted
in this way? Perhaps not, and modifications to the research protocols may indeed change the locus of xenotransplantation projects on the moral continuum we
have constructed. One Canadian research team, for
example, took great care to construct what they call
‘‘high welfare’’ facilities for the pathogen-free pigs,
which included keeping the piglets in groups, using
heated beds and a simulated nursing apparatus, and
providing rooting and exploratory activities and
toys.22 These provisions go a long way toward meeting
the demands of our new nonconsequentialist principle
that animals need to be treated as ends and not means
only. And it also reduces the ‘‘cost’’ side of the consequentialist calculation for the other mode of moral
reasoning we discussed here. This discussion brings into
clear relief how furthering the same ultimate goals but
doing so under different conditions could dramatically
alter the moral assessment of a provocative project. The
method demonstrated here not only shows how projects
can be morally evaluated but also how scientists can
improve the acceptance of their work by attending to
moral considerations that matter intuitively to us all.

casuistical case comparison, parallel to the use of legal
precedent, can help us locate projects on the moral
continuum, enabling us to more effectively determine
where the ethical lines ought to be drawn.
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